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== Funding overview == | == Funding overview == | ||
Governments are the biggest players in the tobacco market. In the US, for example, as Doctor Gio Gori has noted, various areas of government at the turn of the twenty-first century received around $40 billion annually from tobacco, against less than $9 billion in profits received by the tobacco industry itself. "It is governments that benefit from and control the tobacco trade far more than the tobacco industry, which has been virtually nationalized by taxation and the US Master Settlement Agreement with the states," [http://www.olivernorvell.com/GoriReIOM.pdf says Gori]. The Master Settlement Agreement is a price-fixing scheme which makes manufacturers, in effect, surrogate tax collectors, even as direct government-collected taxes also continue to grow exponentially. The situation is similar worldwide, where total taxes on cigarettes typically outstrip the actual price of cigarettes, several times to one. | Governments are the biggest players in the tobacco market. In the US, for example, as Doctor Gio Gori has noted, various areas of government at the turn of the twenty-first century received around $40 billion annually from tobacco, against less than $9 billion in profits received by the tobacco industry itself. "It is governments that benefit from and control the tobacco trade far more than the tobacco industry, which has been virtually nationalized by taxation and the US Master Settlement Agreement with the states," [http://www.olivernorvell.com/GoriReIOM.pdf says Gori]. The Master Settlement Agreement is a price-fixing scheme which makes manufacturers, in effect, surrogate tax collectors, even as direct government-collected taxes also continue to grow exponentially. The situation is similar worldwide, where total taxes on cigarettes typically outstrip the actual price of cigarettes, several times to one. | ||
− | As | + | As the Big Tobacco Industry, shrunken, regulated into submission, and gagged against protest, has declined, the Tobacco Control Industry, supported by governments and by a Pharmaceutical Industry which profits from “smoking cessation” products, has become a financial colossus. The losers are the people. Their losses come in the form of suffering a divisive victimization campaign aimed at smokers, of wealth wasted on Tobacco Control bureaucracy and junk science research, the tarnishing of the good name of science and a loss of trust in the medical establishment, blocking of the development of effective reduced risk cigarettes, and ever-increasing oppression in the form of restrictions on personal choice and individual freedom. All industries, in great part and essentially, are about money. The Pharmaceutical and Tobacco Control industries are about very big money. A general illustration of the major economic forces in play is provided below. |
===Money Flow (graphical)=== | ===Money Flow (graphical)=== | ||
<imagemap> | <imagemap> | ||
− | Image:TC_Money.png | + | Image:TC_Money.png |
# Comment | # Comment | ||
poly 626 258 669 171 649 168 645 86 602 91 598 173 581 177 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]] | poly 626 258 669 171 649 168 645 86 602 91 598 173 581 177 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]] | ||
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===Explanation=== | ===Explanation=== | ||
− | * <span id="market">'''Smokers' | + | * <span id="market">'''Smokers' Market''': A worldwide market, worth billions of dollars, where two main industries – the Tobacco Industry and the Pharmaceutical Industry (marketers of smoking cessation and Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT) products) – are competing for smokers' money and sympathy. The overall functioning of this market is controlled by a third interested party which has basically sided with the Pharmaceutical Industry: government. For government, smokers are an easy cash cow. |
− | :The fourth interest group, the Tobacco Control | + | :The fourth interest group, the Tobacco Control Industry, is working closely together with the Pharmaceutical Industry and government to get their own share of the market, selling advice to government bodies and creating public sympathy for increased taxes and smoking bans which benefit the government and the Pharmaceutical Industries respectively.</span> |
:Smokers are crushed between these interests, eventually paying the bill. | :Smokers are crushed between these interests, eventually paying the bill. | ||
* <span id="NGOs">'''NGOs/Charities'''</span>: Although many TC organizations are also "Non-Governmental Organizations" (NGOs), many other NGOs sponsor TC: Cancer, Asthma, Heart charities and even patient organizations give Tobacco Control forces money out of both idealistic and public-relations motivations. They are funded by governments but also by the general public who still consider these charities as simple well-doers, with that perception reinforced every time they perform an act or make a contribution in favor of "saving the children" and against "Big Tobacco." These charities also often have financial or other ties with, or are facilitated by, the Pharmaceutical Industry. | * <span id="NGOs">'''NGOs/Charities'''</span>: Although many TC organizations are also "Non-Governmental Organizations" (NGOs), many other NGOs sponsor TC: Cancer, Asthma, Heart charities and even patient organizations give Tobacco Control forces money out of both idealistic and public-relations motivations. They are funded by governments but also by the general public who still consider these charities as simple well-doers, with that perception reinforced every time they perform an act or make a contribution in favor of "saving the children" and against "Big Tobacco." These charities also often have financial or other ties with, or are facilitated by, the Pharmaceutical Industry. | ||
− | * <span id="nrtsales">'''NRT | + | * <span id="nrtsales">'''NRT Sales'''</span>: NRT products only include nicotine patches and gum but also, in common usage, extend to anti-depressants and brain-chemistry pharmaceuticals like Zyban and Chantix/Champix, as well as the developing field of anti-smoking vaccines. These products are developed to prevent smoking in the first place or to make it easier for smokers to quit, but they do not always have the desired effect. Side effects reported for some of these "pharmaceutical interventions" include mood swings, anger, violence and suicide attempts. As a whole the effectiveness of these NRT and stop-smoking products Patches and gums don't appear, in formal double-blind placebo-control studies to have the nearly the success rate touted by their producers and the Tobacco Control Industry in general. A personal decision by the smoker to quit "cold turkey" because they themselves desire to do so still seems to be the most successful method of smoking cessation.<ref>[http://www.forces-nl.org/download/DarEtter.pdf Assigned Versus Perceived Placebo Effects in Nicotine Replacement Therapy for Smoking Reduction in Swiss Smokers]</ref><ref>[http://whyquit.com/whyquit/A_RealWorldNRT.html "Real-World" Nicotine Patch and Gum Rates ]</ref> |
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<references /> | <references /> | ||
<span id="pharmaceutical"> | <span id="pharmaceutical"> | ||
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Through their funding of the university medical facilities and faculties that teach and guide our doctors, their funding of scientific studies, their affiliations with public health organizations such as the WHO,<ref>http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-04.html</ref> the CDC<ref>http://www.cdcfoundation.org/what/partners#category-299</ref> and the FDA,<ref>http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/10/guidelines-for-determining-eligibility.html</ref> their intense lobbying of politicians to influence public health policy, and their direct or indirect funding of political campaigns, the tentacles of the Pharmaceutical Industry are everywhere. There are billions of dollars being directly donated or funneled through foundations and non-profits into anti-smoking campaigns, smoking bans, and the increase of tobacco taxation worldwide with the intention of improving the bottom line of the Pharmaceutical Industry as it competes with the Tobacco Industry for the smoker's market. | Through their funding of the university medical facilities and faculties that teach and guide our doctors, their funding of scientific studies, their affiliations with public health organizations such as the WHO,<ref>http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-04.html</ref> the CDC<ref>http://www.cdcfoundation.org/what/partners#category-299</ref> and the FDA,<ref>http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/10/guidelines-for-determining-eligibility.html</ref> their intense lobbying of politicians to influence public health policy, and their direct or indirect funding of political campaigns, the tentacles of the Pharmaceutical Industry are everywhere. There are billions of dollars being directly donated or funneled through foundations and non-profits into anti-smoking campaigns, smoking bans, and the increase of tobacco taxation worldwide with the intention of improving the bottom line of the Pharmaceutical Industry as it competes with the Tobacco Industry for the smoker's market. | ||
− | [[Image:RWJF2003.gif|frame|center|link=|alt=RWJF sponsoring of anti-tobacco research, 1992-2003|RWJF sponsoring of anti-tobacco research | + | [[Image:RWJF2003.gif|frame|center|link=|alt=RWJF sponsoring of anti-tobacco research, 1992-2003|RWJF sponsoring of anti-tobacco research, 1992-2003 (calculated from their on-line database). Note that after 1998, the anti-smoking industry got access to the additional sponsoring facilities through the MSA]] |
'''The following are just a few examples of the pharmaceutical money trail:''' | '''The following are just a few examples of the pharmaceutical money trail:''' | ||
− | *[ | + | *[http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-04.html WHO LAUNCHES PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY TO HELP SMOKERS QUIT] |
:Excerpt: | :Excerpt: | ||
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:To read about the RWJF tobacco control strategy click here: [http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=14774 Taking on Tobacco] | :To read about the RWJF tobacco control strategy click here: [http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=14774 Taking on Tobacco] | ||
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*[http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility/global_health/global_health_partnerships.jsp Tobacco control grantees of a $47,000,000 grant from Pfizer to combat cancer and tobacco use included:] | *[http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility/global_health/global_health_partnerships.jsp Tobacco control grantees of a $47,000,000 grant from Pfizer to combat cancer and tobacco use included:] | ||
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The following link leads to a letter from ASH, UK to Glaxo Smith Kline about how disgusted they are that Derek Bonham, Chairman of Imperial Tobacco, sits on the board of GSK. | The following link leads to a letter from ASH, UK to Glaxo Smith Kline about how disgusted they are that Derek Bonham, Chairman of Imperial Tobacco, sits on the board of GSK. | ||
− | *[http://www. | + | *[http://www.data-yard.net/science/payoffs/ash.pdf Links between ASH, UK and Glaxo Smith Klein (GSK)] |
:Excerpts: | :Excerpts: | ||
− | <blockquote>ASH has worked closely with both Glaxo and SmithKline Beecham staff and always welcomed the active collaboration. (...) We have worked with GSK under the auspices of the WHO-Europe Partnership Project on tobacco dependence and at various one-off opportunities. ASH was instrumental in securing greater government commitment to smoking cessation products in the NHS National Plan and we have helped with PR for both Zyban and Niquitin CQ. Our involvement with GSK staff has, I believe, been mutually beneficial, and we have gained from exposure to the company's arguments and insights (...)</blockquote> | + | <blockquote> ASH has worked closely with both Glaxo and SmithKline Beecham staff and always welcomed the active collaboration. (...) We have worked with GSK under the auspices of the WHO-Europe Partnership Project on tobacco dependence and at various one-off opportunities. ASH was instrumental in securing greater government commitment to smoking cessation products in the NHS National Plan and we have helped with PR for both Zyban and Niquitin CQ. Our involvement with GSK staff has, I believe, been mutually beneficial, and we have gained from exposure to the company's arguments and insights (...)</blockquote> |
<blockquote>This experience is replicated in many organisations, many countries and in business areas beyond the smoking cessation category. (...)</blockquote> | <blockquote>This experience is replicated in many organisations, many countries and in business areas beyond the smoking cessation category. (...)</blockquote> | ||
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<blockquote>ASH has a small shareholding in GSK and I will be attending with others to question you and the Chairman on this situation.... More than anything, I would like to resume normal and constructive relations with GlaxoSmithKline....</blockquote> | <blockquote>ASH has a small shareholding in GSK and I will be attending with others to question you and the Chairman on this situation.... More than anything, I would like to resume normal and constructive relations with GlaxoSmithKline....</blockquote> | ||
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Some examples of financial conflicts of interest between the Tobacco Control Industry and Big Pharma: | Some examples of financial conflicts of interest between the Tobacco Control Industry and Big Pharma: | ||
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*: [http://www.phr.uwaterloo.ca/pubs/179-public-2007-10-15-147734.pdf Does Money talk? Controlling unwanted influences on tobacco cessation research] | *: [http://www.phr.uwaterloo.ca/pubs/179-public-2007-10-15-147734.pdf Does Money talk? Controlling unwanted influences on tobacco cessation research] | ||
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== Governments are senior partners of the tobacco industry == | == Governments are senior partners of the tobacco industry == |