Editing Money

== Funding overview ==
Governments are the biggest players in the tobacco market. In the US, for example, as Doctor Gio Gori has noted, various areas of government at the turn of the twenty-first century received around $40 billion annually from tobacco, against less than $9 billion in profits received by the tobacco industry itself. "It is governments that benefit from and control the tobacco trade far more than the tobacco industry, which has been virtually nationalized by taxation and the US Master Settlement Agreement with the states," [http://www.olivernorvell.com/GoriReIOM.pdf says Gori]. The Master Settlement Agreement is a price-fixing scheme which makes manufacturers, in effect, surrogate tax collectors, even as direct government-collected taxes also continue to grow exponentially. The situation is similar worldwide, where total taxes on cigarettes typically outstrip the actual price of cigarettes, several times to one.
 
As the Big Tobacco Industry, shrunken, regulated into submission, and gagged against protest, has declined, the Tobacco Control Industry, supported by governments and by a Pharmaceutical Industry which profits from “smoking cessation” products, has become a financial colossus. The losers are the people. Their losses come in the form of suffering a divisive victimization campaign aimed at smokers, of wealth wasted on Tobacco Control bureaucracy and junk science research, the tarnishing of the good name of science and a loss of trust in the medical establishment, blocking of the development of effective reduced risk cigarettes, and ever-increasing oppression in the form of restrictions on personal choice and individual freedom. All industries, in great part and essentially, are about money. The Pharmaceutical and Tobacco Control industries are about very big money. A general illustration of the major economic forces in play is provided below.
===Money Flow (graphical)===

<imagemap>
Image:TC_Money.png
# Comment
poly 626 258 669 171 649 168 645 86 602 91 598 173 581 177 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 507 234 510 230 514 229 513 220 507 222 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 588 234 595 232 591 220 587 222 590 230 595 230 591 234 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 495 230 503 228 502 223 494 219 497 216 503 218 498 215 493 218 494 222 502 226 499 229 492 226 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 520 230 527 227 525 220 518 222 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 530 230 536 221 538 225 537 220 530 222 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 543 230 549 227 542 222 546 220 548 221 541 222 548 227 545 230 542 227 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 554 230 561 227 558 220 553 221 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 564 230 566 221 564 221 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 576 230 581 221 583 225 583 230 580 220 576 221 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
poly 606 78 668 66 689 47 684 23 644 4 570 5 534 25 531 48 556 68 [[#pharmaceutical|Pharmaceutical NRT producers]]
# Comment
poly 348 103 379 78 366 74 370 45 482 49 484 56 514 31 482 11 478 20 214 16 213 8 181 34 214 54 218 45 330 49 326 78 317 80 [[#competition|Competitors in the smokers' market]]
# Comment
poly 321 213 460 203 523 180 533 162 519 144 441 121 305 115 198 133 161 155 162 174 208 197 [[#market|Smokers' market]]
# Comment
poly 157 146 196 119 181 89 195 78 139 76 123 124 140 118 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 207 124 215 122 214 117 206 113 209 110 213 112 212 110 205 112 206 116 214 120 213 123 205 121 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 219 124 227 120 224 114 221 115 225 115 225 118 218 122 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 237 124 239 124 236 121 244 117 241 114 236 115 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 248 124 254 122 253 119 247 116 251 114 254 116 252 114 247 115 248 119 252 120 252 123 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 196 100 201 86 196 88 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 204 100 211 97 208 90 203 91 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 214 100 222 98 220 90 215 89 214 86 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 226 100 234 96 231 90 226 91 232 91 232 94 225 97 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 239 100 245 98 241 100 238 96 239 92 242 90 245 92 243 90 238 91 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 250 100 252 100 249 97 251 90 248 94 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
poly 261 100 266 99 265 90 259 92 [[#Tobsales|Tobacco Sales]]
# Comment
poly 71 346 138 336 164 315 159 290 118 270 42 271 5 292 2 315 28 336 [[#govt|Government]]
# Comment
poly 77 258 114 170 97 166 93 82 58 86 54 170 41 173 55 208 [[wikipedia:Tobacco_Master_Settlement_Agreement|Master Settlement Agreement]]
# Comment
poly 593 347 661 337 687 316 685 292 649 271 578 267 532 286 521 309 539 331 [[#TCI|Tobacco Control Industry]]
# Comment
poly 359 349 514 311 352 269 350 287 188 285 195 323 358 331 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 225 347 228 343 232 342 231 333 225 335 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 306 347 312 345 309 333 305 334 306 342 312 344 309 347 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 213 343 221 341 220 336 212 332 215 329 221 331 216 328 211 331 213 335 221 339 218 342 213 341 211 339 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 238 343 244 341 243 333 236 335 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 248 343 253 333 253 333 248 335 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 261 343 266 342 266 338 260 335 264 333 266 334 259 335 266 340 263 343 260 340 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 272 343 277 342 279 337 275 333 271 334 269 338 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
poly 293 343 299 334 301 338 300 333 293 335 [[#gsponsoring|Government sponsoring]]
# Comment
poly 419 471 486 462 516 440 514 416 481 395 415 388 360 406 345 428 358 451 407 469 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 656 421 661 419 657 405 653 406 654 415 660 417 657 420 653 419 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 566 420 569 415 574 415 576 410 573 405 566 407 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 554 416 563 413 561 408 553 404 556 401 561 403 552 404 554 408 562 412 558 415 554 414 552 411 552 414 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 581 416 588 413 586 405 579 407 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 592 416 597 406 600 410 599 405 591 409 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 605 416 612 414 610 410 605 408 608 405 611 407 609 405 604 406 605 410 611 414 604 414 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 617 416 624 414 622 405 615 407 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 628 416 630 406 628 406 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 640 416 646 406 649 412 647 405 640 407 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
poly 519 412 543 382 560 391 539 336 484 341 498 355 480 385 [[#NGOs|Non-Governmental Organizations]]
# Comment
poly 141 269 196 262 183 249 198 219 159 197 138 223 122 216 [[#taxes|Tobacco taxes]]
poly 208 246 213 232 208 233 [[#taxes|Tobacco taxes]]
poly 215 246 223 242 222 239 214 243 [[#taxes|Tobacco taxes]]
poly 226 246 230 242 234 246 232 239 234 236 230 239 227 236 [[#taxes|Tobacco taxes]]
poly 239 246 241 246 238 242 246 238 242 236 238 237 [[#taxes|Tobacco taxes]]
poly 251 246 257 244 256 241 250 238 254 236 257 238 255 236 249 238 256 243 253 246 [[#taxes|Tobacco taxes]]
# Comment
poly 536 147 560 119 575 127 556 75 505 79 517 92 500 120 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
poly 451 109 459 107 458 102 450 98 453 95 458 97 449 98 453 102 457 103 457 108 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
poly 464 109 471 107 470 102 462 107 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
poly 482 109 484 109 480 105 488 101 484 99 480 100 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
poly 493 109 498 108 498 104 492 101 496 99 498 100 491 101 498 106 495 109 491 106 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
poly 449 85 453 77 460 82 459 79 458 82 449 73 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
poly 465 85 468 78 475 83 472 79 476 75 474 71 465 75 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
poly 483 85 488 71 483 73 [[#nrtsales|Nicotine Replacement Therapy Sales]]
# Comment
poly 72 79 139 69 164 48 160 25 123 5 44 5 8 25 4 47 27 68 [[#tobacco|Tobacco Industry]]
</imagemap>

===Explanation===
* <span id="market">'''Smokers' Market''': A worldwide market, worth  billions of dollars, where two main industries – the Tobacco Industry and the Pharmaceutical Industry (marketers of smoking cessation and Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT) products) – are competing for smokers' money and sympathy. The overall functioning of this market is controlled by a third interested party which has basically sided with the Pharmaceutical Industry: government. For government, smokers are an easy cash cow.
:The fourth interest group, the Tobacco Control Industry, is working closely together with the Pharmaceutical Industry and government to get their own share of the market, selling advice to government bodies and creating public sympathy for increased taxes and smoking smoking bans which benefit the government and the Pharmaceutical Industries respectively.</span>
:Smokers are crushed between these interests, eventually paying the bill. 
* <span id="NGOs">'''NGOs/Charities'''</span>: Although many TC organizations are also "Non-Governmental Organizations" (NGOs), many other NGOs sponsor TC: Cancer, Asthma, Heart charities and even patient organizations give Tobacco Control forces money out of both idealistic and public-relations motivations. They are funded by governments but also by the general public who still consider these charities as simple well-doers, with that perception reinforced every time they perform an act or make a contribution in favor of "saving the children" and against "Big Tobacco." These charities also often have financial or other ties with, or are facilitated by, the Pharmaceutical Industry.
* <span id="nrtsales">'''NRT Sales'''</span>: NRT products only include nicotine patches and gum but also, in common usage, extend to anti-depressants and brain-chemistry pharmaceuticals like Zyban and Chantix/Champix, as well as the developing field of anti-smoking vaccines. These products are developed to prevent smoking in the first place or to make it easier for smokers to quit, but they do not always have the desired effect. Side effects reported for some of these "pharmaceutical interventions" include mood swings, anger, violence and suicide attempts.  As a whole the effectiveness of these NRT and stop-smoking products Patches and gums don't appear, in formal double-blind placebo-control studies to have the nearly the success rate touted by their producers and the Tobacco Control Industry in general.  A personal decision by the smoker to quit "cold turkey" because they themselves desire to do so still seems to be the most successful method of smoking cessation.<ref>[http://www.forces-nl.org/download/DarEtter.pdf Assigned Versus Perceived Placebo Effects in Nicotine Replacement Therapy for Smoking Reduction in Swiss Smokers]</ref><ref>[http://whyquit.com/whyquit/A_RealWorldNRT.html "Real-World" Nicotine Patch and Gum Rates ]</ref>
<references />
<span id="pharmaceutical">

== Pharmaceutical industry funding of the Tobacco Control industry  ==
</span>

Through their funding of the university medical facilities and faculties that teach and guide our doctors, their funding of scientific studies, their affiliations with public health organizations such as the WHO,<ref>[http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-04.html]</ref> the CDC<ref>[http://www.cdcfoundation.org/what/partners#category-299]</ref> and the FDA,<ref>[http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/10/guidelines-for-determining-eligibility.html]</ref> their intense lobbying of politicians to influence public health policy, and their direct or indirect funding of political campaigns, the tentacles of the Pharmaceutical Industry are everywhere. There are billions of dollars being directly donated or funneled through foundations and non-profits into anti-smoking campaigns, smoking bans, and the increase of tobacco taxation worldwide with the intention of improving the bottom line of the Pharmaceutical Industry as it competes with the Tobacco Industry for the smoker's market.

'''The following are just a few examples of the pharmaceutical money trail:'''  

*[http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-04.html WHO LAUNCHES PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY TO HELP SMOKERS QUIT]   

:Excerpt: 

<blockquote>The strength of the Partnership Project lies in the fact that it has brought together three major pharmaceutical companies, Glaxo Wellcome, Novartis Consumer Health and Pharmacia & Upjohn, all manufacturers of treatment products for tobacco dependence, to support a common goal that will have a significant impact on public health. The Project provides a model which can provide a basis for future partnerships with the private sector in other important health areas.</blockquote>

*[http://cleanairquality.blogspot.ca/2007/02/smoking-bans-good-public-policy-or.html Smoking bans: good public policy? Or simply a great pharmaceutical marketing plan? ]

:Excerpt:  

<blockquote>(...) upon some preliminary investigation it is clear that these NGOs are backed by $446,000,000 from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) which has direct ties to the Johnson & Johnson Company – the manufacturer of Nicoderm & Nicoderm CQ via its wholly owned subsidiary ALZA. Recently, the buyout of Pfizer Consumer Health (see pgs 4 and 61)means J & J profits even more from the passage of smoking bans thru additional sales of Nicotrol, Nicorette, Commit, (see pgs 32,33,56) and any other over the counter smoking cessation drugs once manufactured by Pfizer Consumer Health division.
 Global Health Partnerships </blockquote>

:To read about the RWJF tobacco control strategy click here: [http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=14774 Taking on Tobacco]

*[http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility/global_health/global_health_partnerships.jsp  Tobacco control grantees  of a $47,000,000 grant from Pfizer to combat cancer and tobacco use included :]  

<blockquote>Alliance for Control of Tobacco Use (Brazil), Hellenic Thoracic Society (Greece), SAMBA (Sweden), and Umberto Veronesi Foundation (Italy) 
•  Developing Tobacco Control Capacity: Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) International/Framework Convention Alliance (FCA) (Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Costa Rica; Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Lebanon), and Mexican Council on Tobacco 
•  Protecting Nonsmokers from Secondhand Smoke: American Cancer Society (Algeria and Tunisia) and Chinese Association on Tobacco Control 
•  Helping Smokers Quit: Comprehensive Cancer Center at Freiburg University Medical Center (Germany), Health Promotional Foundation (Poland), Heart and Stroke Foundation of Ontario (Canada), Hungarian Academy of Teaching Family Physicians, Japan Medical-Dental Association for Tobacco Control, Partnership for Prevention (U.S.), Philippine Business for Social Progress, QUIT UK/European Network of Quitlines (Central and Eastern Europe)</blockquote>

The following link leads to a letter from ASH, UK to Glaxo Smith Kline about how disgusted they are that Derek Bonham, Chairman of Imperial Tobacco, sits on the board of GSK.

*[http://www.data-yard.net/science/payoffs/ash.pdf Links between ASH, UK and Glaxo Smith Klein (GSK)]

:Excerpts:

<blockquote> ASH has worked closely with both Glaxo and SmithKline Beecham staff and always welcomed the active collaboration. (...) We have worked with GSK under the auspices of the WHO-Europe Partnership Project on tobacco dependence and at various one-off opportunities. ASH was instrumental in securing greater government commitment to smoking cessation products in the NHS National Plan and we have helped with PR for both Zyban and Niquitin CQ. Our involvement with GSK staff has, I believe, been mutually beneficial, and we have gained from exposure to the company's arguments and insights (...)</blockquote> 

<blockquote>This experience is replicated in many organisations, many countries and in business areas beyond the smoking cessation category.  (...)</blockquote>

<blockquote> There are clear conflicts of interest - every time someone successfully uses a GSK smoking cessation product the market for tobacco declines. Every time a smoker switches to 'lights' as an alternative to quitting the market for smoking cessation is diminished.</blockquote>

<blockquote>Most of the measures that drive people to want to quit smoking and use GSK products are exactly those that are opposed by tobacco companies. Such measures include:</blockquote>
<blockquote> 
: Restrictions on smoking in public places and workplaces
: Marketing restrictions on tobacco companies
: Higher tobacco taxation
: Greater NHS involvement in smoking cessation
: Regulatory measures to be applied to tobacco products</blockquote>

<blockquote>(...)</blockquote> 

<blockquote>ASH has a small shareholding in GSK and I will be attending with others to question you and the Chairman on this situation.... More than anything, I would like to resume normal and constructive relations with GlaxoSmithKline....</blockquote>

Some examples of financial conflicts of interest between the Tobacco Control Industry and Big Pharma:

*:[http://www.canada.com/victoriatimescolonist/news/story.html?id=6499c88d-2dba-406b-8efa-7bef9e45d1af Drug companies among biggest funders of stop-smoking charities]

*:[http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/01/new-study-shows-that-nicotine.html New Study Shows that Nicotine Replacement Therapy is Ineffective for Gradual Smoking Cessation, But Concludes the Opposite ]

*:[http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/09/chantix-lawsuits-piling-up-dangers-from.html Chantix Lawsuits Piling Up; Dangers from Severe Financial Conflicts of Interests of Tobacco Control Researchers and Institutions Revealed ]

*:[http://cagecanada.blogspot.ca/2009/09/how-long-will-this-billion-dollar.html HOW LONG WILL THIS BILLION DOLLAR CHARADE CONTINUE? - John R. Polito ]

*:[http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/10/guidelines-for-determining-eligibility.html FDA Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Advisory Committees are Ridiculous and Ensure that Conflicts of Interest Will Continue to Plague Agency ]

*:[http://cleanairquality.blogspot.ca/2008/01/pharmaceutical-interests-who-funded.html Pharmaceutical interests who funded smoking ban laws expect pharmaceutical nicotine sales to reach $4.6 billion annually by 2016 ]

*:[http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/2007/02/wall-street-journal-article-highlights.html Wall Street Journal Article Highlights Financial Conflicts of Interest of Chair of Federal Smoking Cessation Guidelines Panel ]

*:[http://cagecanada.blogspot.ca/2011/05/ontario-lung-association-charity.html ONTARIO LUNG ASSOCIATION - CHARITY ORGANIZATION OR BIG PHARMA FRONT GROUP? ]

*: [http://www.pfizer.ca/en/advancing_medicine/partnerships/download/22 What is the Ottawa Model for Smoking Cessation?]

== Governments are senior partners of the tobacco industry ==

In some countries, taxes, qualified by many as regressive because they mostly affect the poor, amount to over 75% of the retail price of cigarettes.  While these taxes and the ''hidden taxes'' from the Master Settlement Agreement (US) were supposed to help pay for the alleged additional health care costs of smoking, and to educate individuals, particularly children, on the health hazards of smoking, they are mostly used for other purposes such as infrastructure, social programs, education and general state funding.<ref>http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/24/1/220.full</ref> Of course the tobacco control organizations also get generous pieces of the money pie that help sustain the careers of their directors and staff.  But as governments are increasingly struggling to balance budgets, they are now slashing tobacco control funding despite vociferous protests by Tobacco Control Industry groups and individuals who have long benefited from such funding.  Those protests obviously make no reference to the payrolls for those aforementioned careers but generally focus on such TC Tactics as imagined projections about the number of children who'll "die from smoking" as a result of the dastardly cuts.<ref>http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press_releases/post/2011_11_30_state_report</ref>  
<ref>http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/956467/big-tobacco-big-winner-as-harper-government-decimates-federal-tobacco-control-strategy</ref> <ref>http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2811%2961855-2/fulltext?rss=yes</ref> <ref>http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/tobacco_unfiltered/post/2012_06_29_nc</ref>
 
Additionally, pushed by greedy tobacco control lobbyists, governments – such as some of the provincial ones in Canada – are salivating at the prospect of striking  gold like their U.S. state counterparts did through the Master Settlement Agreement.  These governments are now taking legal actions against the Tobacco Industry supposedly to seek damages for the costs of treating smoking-related illnesses but actually just to raise money for themselves and their own branches of the Tobacco Control Industry.<ref>http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2012/06/08/quebec-government-files-suit-against-tobacco-manufacturers.html</ref>  If the Canadian provinces are successful, expect a global pandemic of government lawsuits against Big Tobacco in country after country – allowing them to raise their incomes from the sale of tobacco products without the political fallout of directly raising taxes on smokers.  Of course the smokers will be the ones paying the money, but the MSA style of misdirection will make many smokers simply blame the price rises on the tobacco companies themselves.
===References===
<references />